Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Radical interpretation, philosophy: is an expression for a family of thought experiments, which has the object of the translation of a completely foreign language into the language of the interpreter, which the interpreter does not understand at all. See also translation, indeterminacy, Gavagai._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Donald Davidson on Radical Interpretation - Dictionary of Arguments
I (d) 70f Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson: first, to find out the topic independently, then ask whether true - because the situation, which usually gives rise to belief, also determines the truth conditions. - - - I (e) 112 Radical Interpretation/Davidson: it is not about a creation of a relationship formulated in meta-language between utterances of two languages, but about a structurally revealing theory of the interpretation of an object language - the reference to the known language is omitted. >Object language, >Metalanguage. - - - Glüer II 40 Translation/Interpretation/Radical Interpretation/Davidson/Glüer: Translation knowledge is not interpretive knowledge - E.g. Nabokov "My sister, do you remember the mountain and the tall oak, and the Ladore?" - translation of the Russian sentence "..." - from the fact that this is correct, it does not follow that I only understand one of the two sentences. >Understanding, >Translation. Glüer II 40 Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: mutual dependence on belief and meaning - not one without the other can be opened up - starting point: minimal belief: that a sentence is true at a certain time (occasion) - a) opportunity sentences: allows construction of hypothetical truth-equivalences. >Disquotation scheme. Glüer II 66 Radical Interpretation/DavidsonVsQuine: there is a general truth subordination -> Externalism: the belief contents are not independent from the world. - - - Frank I 626ff Radical Interpretation/Davidson: the content of mental states is not to be determined independently from the linguistic behavior - the truth of the believed sentences is presupposed - otherwise no evidence can be derived from the environment and behavior would be meaningless. - The knowledge of the truth conditions is presupposed by the speaker, otherwise behavior cannot be interpreted. See other autors on externalism. Frank I 634 + Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
||
> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Radical Interpretation
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19