Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rationality, philosophy: rationality is the ability of a being to consciously adapt to a situation due to the generalizations of his experiences. It can also be rational to want to learn something new. See also system, order, creativity, discoveries, evaluation, repetition._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jonathan Bennett on Rationality - Dictionary of Arguments
Millikan I 66 Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems that a rational person should not take "shortcuts". I.e., he must consider not only positive evidence, but also negative evidence. >Evidence, >Knowledge, >Meaning/intending, >Beliefs. General/formal: Suppose John believes. "usually: if A then B" and furthermore: "non-(usually: if A-and-not-C, then B)" rational: would it then follow that John must believe a) "usually: if A then C" and b) if A-and-C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases. 1. the only evidence for C comes from the fact that John knows that usually if A then C. Then he should simply move from A to B. 2. John has independent ways of believing C based on evidence. And he comes across A while he already has evidence for non-C. I 67 Then he should rationally also believe that non-C and not infer B from A. 3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand whether C. Question: then, to be rational, does he have to check C beforehand? Millikan: let us assume that he must. Problem: if that now again depends solely on his believing: "usually, if D, then C", etc. Rationality/Millikan: Problem: the more knowledge one then acquires, the more he has to exert himself to be rational at all. Wouldn't it be better if he refrained from all the checking? >Review, >Contradictions, >Consistency._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Bennett
> Counter arguments in relation to Rationality
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18