Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Metaphor: a metaphor is the transmission of a linguistic expression into a different context than that in which it was expected. The expectation results from the frequency of previous uses in certain contexts. Through the transmission an expression, which is actually expected at this place in the speech, is replaced. The condition for replacement is a certain similarity between the characteristics of the old and the new expression required for understanding. The improbability of the appearance of the new expression is a condition for the rhetorical effect of the metaphor._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Paul Ricoeur on Metaphors - Dictionary of Arguments
II 46 Metaphor/Ricoeur: (...) the relation between the literal meaning and the figurative meaning in a metaphor is like an abridged version within a single sentence of the complex interplay of significations that characterize the literary work as a whole. >Connotation/Ricoeur. II 47 The theory of metaphor comes down to us from the ancient rhetoricians, but this theory will not fulfill the role we expect of it without one important revision. This revision, briefly stated, shifts the problem of metaphor from the semantics of the word to the semantics of the sentence. >Rhetoric/Ricoeur. II 49 Metaphor/Tradition: (1) Metaphor is a trope, a figure of discourse that concerns denomination. (2) It represents the extension of the meaning of a name through deviation from the literal meaning of words. (3) The reason for this deviation is resemblance. (4) The function of resemblance is to ground the substitution of the figurative meaning of a word in place of the literal meaning, which could have been used in the same place. (5) Hence the substituted signification does not represent any semantic innovation. We can translate a metaphor, i.e., replace the literal meaning for which the figurative word is a substitute. In effect, substitution plus restitution equals zero. (6) Since it does not represent a semantic innovation, a metaphor does not furnish any new information about reality. This is why it can be counted as one of the emotive functions of discourse. I.A. RichardsVsTradition/Ricoeur: The first presupposition [that no new information is involved] to be rejected is that a metaphor is simply an accident of denomination, a displacement in the signification of words. With this presupposition classical rhetoric limited itself to the description of an effect of meaning that is really the result of the impact on the word of a production of meaning that takes place at the level of a complete utterance or sentence. II 50 Ricoeur: The metaphor is the result of the tension between two terms in a metaphorical utterance. (...) [this] tension in a metaphorical utterance is really not something that occurs between two terms in the utterance, but rather between two opposed interpretations of the utterance. The metaphorical interpretation presupposes a literal interpretation which self-destructs in a significant contradiction. It is this process of self-destruction or transformation which imposes a sort of twist on the words, an extension of meaning thanks to which we can make sense where a literal interpretation would be literally nonsensical. II 51 Resemblence/Tradition: It is now possible to return to the third presupposition of the classical rhetorical conception of metaphor, the role of resemblance. This has often been misunderstood. Often it has been reduced to the role of images in poetic discourse, so that for many critics, especially the older ones, studying an author‘s metaphors meant discussing the nomenclature of the images used to illustrate his ideas. RicoeurVsTradition: But if metaphor does not consist in clothing an idea in an image, if it consists instead in reducing the shock engendered by two incompatible ideas, then it is in the reduction of this gap or difference that resemblance plays a role. What is at stake in a metaphorical utterance, in other words, is the appearance of kinship where ordinary vision does not perceive any relationship. Trope/Tradition: For classical rhetoric (...) a trope was the simple substitution of one word for another. But substitution is a sterile operation, whereas in a live metaphor the tension [is] between the words (...). II 52 RicoeurVsTradition: within a tension theory of metaphor, however, such as we are here opposing to a substitution theory, a new signification emerges, which embraces the whole sentence. In this sense, a metaphor is an instantaneous creation, a semantic innovation which has no status in already established language and which only exists because of the attribution of an unusual or an unexpected predicate. Metaphor therefore is more like the resolution of an enigma than a simple association based on resemblance; it is constituted by the resolution of a semantic dissonance. Two conclusions: 1. Real metaphors are not translatable. 2. A metaphor is not anornament of discourse. It has more than an emotive value because II 53 it offers new information. >Symbol/Ricoeur. II 66 Metaphor/model/Max Black/Ricoeur: The theory of metaphor can (...) be extended in a third way in the direction of the most specific traits of symbols. Numerous authors have remarked upon the kinship between metaphors and models. This kinship plays a decisive role, for example, in the work of Max Black, which is even entitled Models and Metaphors .(1) And from his side, the English theologian Ian Ramsey has attempted to elucidate the function of religious language by revising Max Black's theory in an appropriate fashion.(2) Such a rapprochement between models and metaphors allows us to develop the theory of metaphor in a direction (...) of the referential dimension. II 67 Ricoeur: Let us apply this concept of model to metaphor. The guideline here is the relation between the two notions of a heuristic fiction and the redescription that occurs through the transference of this fiction to reality. It is this double movement that we also find in metaphor, for "a memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate for the one as a lens for seeing the other. . . Thanks to this detour through the heuristic fiction we perceive new connections among things. The basis of this transfer is the presumed isomorphism between the model and its domain of application. It is this isomorphism that legitimates the "analogical transfer of a vocabulary" and that allows a metaphor to function like a model and "reveal new relationships“.(3) II 68 In the case of metaphor, [the] redescription is guided by the interplay between differences and resemblances that gives rise to the tension at the level of the utterance. It is precisely from this tensive apprehension that a new vision of reality springs forth, which ordinary vision resists because it is attached to the ordinary use of words. The eclipse of the objective, manipulable world thus makes way for the revelation of a new dimension of reality and truth. Copula/metaphor/Ricoeur: [in the metaphor] „is" signifies both is and is not. The literal "is" is overturned by the absurdity and surmounted by a metaphorical "is" equivaThus poetic language does not tell how things literally are, but what they are like. ((s) DavidsonVsRicoeur: cf. Metaphor/Davidson). Symbol/metaphor/Ricoeur: (...) we must accept two contrary propositions concerning the relationship between metaphors and symbols. On one side, there is more in the metaphor than in the symbol; on the other side, there is more in the symbol than in the metaphor. >Symbol/Ricoeur. 1. Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy, 1962. Cornell University Press. 2. lan Ramsey, Models and Mystery (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Models for Divine Activity (London: S.C.M. Press, 1973); Religious Language (London: S.C.M. Press, 1957). 3. Max Black op. cit. P. 238._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20