Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Reality, philosophy: A. It is controversial, which should be counted to reality, that is to say, the set of objects and states which occur in the world. Theories differ strongly regarding the definitions of facts and situations or the consideration of internal states of subjects. Thus, a situation can be described in many ways, whereby very different assumptions about the involved objects and relations come into play. See also ontology, realism, recognition, epistemology, constructivism, facts, situations, internal/external, totality, relations, simulation.
B.Reality is an expression for the totality of what is opposed to the perception of subjects and not only imagined. In this sense, reality is what is independent of us; on the other hand, some authors regard their formability as proof of their existence. See also dependence, independence, possibility, necessity, actualism, realism, idealism, constructivism, present, simulation, aboutness, circularity, objects, things, order._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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I. Kant on Reality - Dictionary of Arguments
Strawson V 76 Reality/StrawsonVsKant: why should the object of consciousness not have a distinct (from this independent) existence, even if they coincide point by point with the experience? --- Stra V 156 "Everything else"/StrawsonVsKant: the term that everything would be arranged differently with respect to the present time, is completely empty (> Skepticism/Davidson). - Equally empty: the assumption of a change in the external temporal relations. --- Stra V 231 Reality/appearance/Kant: it is pointless to deny that there is something beyond our experience, as it would be pointless for the blind to deny that the objects have further characteristics- what we must deny is that any other aspect of reality is in a kind of systematic connection with the aspects that we already know - noumenal world/StrawsonVsKant unnecessary to ever assume unperceivable - instead modest noumenon: that what we can still discover._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |