Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Reality, philosophy: A. It is controversial, which should be counted to reality, that is to say, the set of objects and states which occur in the world. Theories differ strongly regarding the definitions of facts and situations or the consideration of internal states of subjects. Thus, a situation can be described in many ways, whereby very different assumptions about the involved objects and relations come into play. See also ontology, realism, recognition, epistemology, constructivism, facts, situations, internal/external, totality, relations, simulation.
B.Reality is an expression for the totality of what is opposed to the perception of subjects and not only imagined. In this sense, reality is what is independent of us; on the other hand, some authors regard their formability as proof of their existence. See also dependence, independence, possibility, necessity, actualism, realism, idealism, constructivism, present, simulation, aboutness, circularity, objects, things, order._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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J.R. Searle on Reality - Dictionary of Arguments
III 168 Reality/Maturana: the nervous system (autopoietic) creates reality. SearleVsMaturana: there is a genetic fallacy: from the fact that our image is constructed, it does not follow that reality is constructed. III 179 E.g. someone says: "In reality everything is different"/Berkeley: (Berkeley claims anyway, that matter does not exist) if the matter does not exist, everything stays the same. III 185 Truth/reality/Searle: truth cannot coincide because each (true or false) representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others. -> Aspects/Searle; >Conceptual scheme. Ontology/Searle: an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view. PutnamVsSearle: there is no "ready made world". >"...if everything was different." >Berkeley. III 194 Background/Searle: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box. The background helps us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. >Background/Searle, >Moore's hands._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |