Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Event: A change of state. The event itself has no duration, otherwise the beginning and the end of the event would have to have their own duration or the beginning and the end of an event in turn would be independent events. See also regress, process, flux, change, states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jaegwon Kim on Events - Dictionary of Arguments
Schwarz I 132 Event/LewisVsKim: definition: Def Event/Kim: (Kim 1976)(1): a triple of a thing, a time and a property. LewisVsKim: (1986f(5),196) that is too fragile: Schwarz I 133 This assigns too many essential properties to events. For example, a football match could have happened a little later or a little different. Or would it have been another game then? Bennett: (1988(4),§23 24) intuitively the question has no sense. Schwarz: that's not what Lewis is all about. But fragility is what matters when it comes to causes and effects: Def Fragility/fragile/Event/Lewis/(s): a modified event would not be the same but different. Then modification cannot be expressed at all: "what was modified? >Identity, >Identification, >Similarity, >Distinctions, >Classification. Counterfactual analysis: according to it, A causes B if B would not have happened without A. >Counterfactual conditionals. Question: under what circumstances would one event have happened (even if it was different) and under what circumstances would it have been replaced by another. This will lead to problems later on. Cause/effect/Lewis/Schwarz: both are no intuitive event. For example acoustic feedback: here the later temporal parts are caused by the earlier ones. (1986f(5),172f). >Cause, >Effect. Similarly: e.g. the temporal parts of persons are linked by causal relationships! >Temporal identity, >Parts, cf. >Continuants, >Person. But these temporal parts are not events in the intuitive sense. Causes such as the presence of oxygen in an explosion (ok, as a cause) are also not an event in the everyday sense. (1986d(6),261). Event/BennettVsLewis/MellorVsLewis/Schwarz: shouldn't Lewis rather speak of "facts"? "that p causes q". Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative, but only a terminological variant. >Facts, >Space-time regions. 1. Jaegwon Kim [1976]: “Events as Property Exemplifications”. In Myles Brand und Douglas Walton (ed.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, 159–177 4. Jonathan Bennett [1988]: Events and Their Names. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. D. Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kim I J. Kim Philosophy of Mind 2010 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20