Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Nelson Goodman on Reference - Dictionary of Arguments
III 57ff Denotation/Goodman: something that does not denote, can still refer by explication and expression. >Denotation, >Expression, >Explanation, >Terminology/Goodman. Def denote/Goodman: to denote means, to make reference, but being denoted does not necessarily mean to refer to something. And yet, expressions like representation are also a mode of symbolization. And an image must stand for that, what it expresses, it must symbolize it, it must refer to it. III 63 ff In normal language: the reference of "man" to "Churchill" and "word" to "man" is clearly denotation. But: if, on the other hand, Churchill symbolizes "man", and "man" symbolizes "word" the reference is clearly exemplification. >Exemplification, >Symbols. --- IV 63 Denotation/exemplification/Goodman: denotation and exemplification go in opposite directions. Possession (of properties) is not a kind of reference. Not all chains formed from references direct the reference from one end to another. Example: the name of the name of the rose is not the name of the rose._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18