Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
|Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.|
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Saul A. Kripke on Reference - Dictionary of Arguments
Reference/Kripke: the reference of the name is not determined by a description, but by a "causal" chain of communication.
Kripke: the relevant element is the actual chain of communication, not the way the speaker came about his reference.
>Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >referential/attributive.
Baptism: baptism has a correct causal chain, but: it has added conditions and no personal knowledge.
It is generally not the case that the reference of a name is determined by identifying the specific characteristics, through certain properties that the referee alone meets and of which the speaker knows or believes that they apply.
Reference: "water is H2O", "light is a photon flux" or "heat is the motion of molecules": if I refer to heat, then I do not refer to an inner sensation someone may have, but to external phenomenon which we perceive through our sense of perception. It caused the characteristic sensation that we call the sensation of heat.
Reference: we determine what light is by the fact that it is the one thing in the outside world that affects our eyes in a certain way.
In the case of proper names, the reference can be defined in various ways.
Establishing reference: is done a priori (contingent) - not synonymous.
Meaning: meaning is analytic (and required).
Definition: the definition specifies reference and expresses truth a priori.
Reference: e.g. "Her husband is kind to her"/Kripke: variant: the (absent) husband is not nice. Then the statement is false for all authors (because of the absent husband). There is a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference.
Goedel-Schmidt Case/Kripke: description does not determine the reference - we would not withdraw the name when we learn something new.
Kripke thesis: Donnellan's distinction referential/attributive. Generalized: a speaker can believe that his/her specific intention coincides with his/her general intention in a situation for one of two reasons: a) "simple" case: his/her specific intention is to refer to the semantic referee, (by definition)(that is Donnellan's attributive use), b) "complex" case: the intentions are different, but the speaker believes that they refer to the same object (referential). VsDonnellan: one must not understand the referential as proper names. The distinction simple/complex is equally applicable to descriptions and names.
Newen I 111
Direct reference/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: Kripke calls the object theory of names the theory of direct reference._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
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