Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Hilary Putnam on Reference - Dictionary of Arguments
VI 395 Theory of Reference/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: the theory of reference might refute that (but not a theory of meaning). >Metaphysical realism, >Meaning theory. --- III 52f Counterfactual Conditional/reference/representation/Fodor: thesis: the actual nature of reference is explained by means of counterfactual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditional. Asymmetric dependence: cat token expressions are triggered by cats, but also by many other things. III 54 Reference comes into being by causal attachment to the world, i.e. also through images and mockups. If does not come about by cats, then it does not come about by pictures of cats. III 56 Then (counterfactual) law: pictures of cats trigger "cat". N.B.: this is ultimately dependent on real cats. III 57 Fodor: if pictures do not work as a trigger, then cats also do not work as a trigger (PutnamVs). III 61 Reference/Hermeneutics: there cannot be necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x (FodorVs). That leads to meaning-holism, which in turn is followed by a meaning-nihilism. >Meaning holism, >Semantic holism. III 64 PutnamVs: e.g. witch, perhaps analytically female, nonetheless there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for "witch". A witch-law would be wrong because of non-existence, because there is no world with witches. However, appropriate counterfactual conditionals could be true. N.B.: their truth is not explained by the law (Armstrong: anyway vice versa). III 65 PutnamVsFodor: for correct asymmetric dependence (the word through the trigger) this counterfactual conditional has to be wrong: if conmen cannot trigger any statement, then soldiers cannot either. III 69 Reference/PutnamVsFodor: previous speech behavior of previous generations is a contributing cause. Otherwise "backward law": false: if cats do not trigger, then there is also no previous behavior. But this is correct vice versa (but only if the cause is interpreted as a causal factor). FodorVs: its causality underlies the colloquial cause-term (direct response? behaviouristic?). PutnamVs: that is interest-relative. III 78 Reference/PutnamVsFodor: reference cannot reduce them with the help of the terms "law", "counterfactual conditionals" or "causality". III 133 Reference/Fodor: according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability of reference, one speaks of individual sciences or everyday language causality. >Inscrutability of reference. III 140 Refernce: the fundamental physics, cannot explain the possibility of referring to something or the assertion of something. Fundamental physics cannot even do it when it comes to their own territory. III 208 Reference: from the fact that some words do not refer without causal link it does not follow that reference itself would be causal. It is only subject to causal restrictions. --- V 75 Reference: thesis: input is shaped by concepts. There are no inputs that allow only a single description that would be independent of all conceptual decisions. V 79 Reference/externalism: (external, divine position): problem: what actually is reference. Reference cannot be causal because "alien" always refers to aliens. >Externalism. --- I (a) 34 Reference: if reference is fixed, you can come up with any theories on the subject. I (a) 35 Physical broadband concepts such as size and cause allow also to formulate failed descriptions. Kripke: then names are usable without having true beliefs about the referent. I (b) 65 Reference: in logic: reference is that what corresponds to the description. Field: Field has shown that this does not fulfill the task. I (a) 67ff Primitive Reference/Putnam: e.g. creatures that can distinguish 17 properties and number them: "Pee-sevunteen-this" (sic): these are, in fact, feelings of the beings themselves. This amounts to the causal theory of reference. When it is expanded to absent, past or future objects this is not necessary and sufficient conditions are introduced. I (b) 69 Semantic rise: one day the mass introduces the concept of a reference: "Uk-ook reefur-this" (sic). That would not be our reference, otherwise paradoxes arise. It only becomes a correct language with quantifiers. N.B.: with quantifiers the causal connection between X and the reference to X is dissolved. I (b) 70 Field: Tarski has shown how reference to primitive reference (show plus noise) can be traced back. +> Gricean intention: Grice/Avramides, > Intentions. --- Rorty I 312 (According to Rorty): Putnam: a "causal" theory of reference cannot help: because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly relate to something is just as mysterious as the question, how the term "cat" has done this. --- Rorty IV 20 ff Rorty: Relation/Putnam: early: only the causal theory of reference (not the intentional one) can save us from relativism. --- Rorty VI 123 Rorty: causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke, also self-criticism on earlier writings: the description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that neither in a greater nor lesser extent stand in an "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" relationship. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: VsDifferentiation "intrinsic"/"relational"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf, Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |