Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rules, philosophy: rules are restrictions of a domain of possibilities for subjects, communities or functionaries, or generally for acting individuals or groups. Rules may be implicit or explicit, and may be implemented by ordinance or by jointly developing equally authorized participants, e.g. in a discourse. In another sense, rules can be understood as actual regularities that can be discovered by observation. These rules can be discovered not only in action, but also in the nature of objects such as linguistic structures. See also norms, values, rule following, private language, language rules, discourse, ethics, morality, cognitivism, intuitionism, society, practice._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Brandom on Rules - Dictionary of Arguments
I 59 Rule/Wittgenstein/Brandom: application of a rule may prohibit or permit performance - the rule determines the accuracy only if it is applied correctly - therefore, it always takes more rules, down to the last, implicit rules. Interpretation/Wittgenstein: Rules for the application of a rule. >Interpretation/Wittgenstein. I 62 Background: practices. >Practise. I 119 Wittgenstein: he uses "rule" in at least three different meanings: 1) Rule says explicitly what one must do. 2) Everything that guides the behavior of the person whose behavior is being judged, no matter if discursively or conceptually. 3) Sometimes just talks about following the rules when behavior is subject to normative judgment. Game: the rule can be a substitute for teaching playfully. But also: a rule is used neither in the classroom nor in the game itself. >Language game. I 120 Color charts and even signposts are expressions of a rule. >Colour. There is no comprehension of a rule that is not an interpretation. Brandom: no rule without asserting, judging and describing. Make an announcement or giving orders is not rule-following. >Rule following. I 820 Rules/Wittgenstein/Brandom: pro Wittgenstein: explicit norms are only intelligible against a background of implicit ones - Vs: nevertheless it is possible that interpretation is involved at every level. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19