Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rules, philosophy: rules are restrictions of a domain of possibilities for subjects, communities or functionaries, or generally for acting individuals or groups. Rules may be implicit or explicit, and may be implemented by ordinance or by jointly developing equally authorized participants, e.g. in a discourse. In another sense, rules can be understood as actual regularities that can be discovered by observation. These rules can be discovered not only in action, but also in the nature of objects such as linguistic structures. See also norms, values, rule following, private language, language rules, discourse, ethics, morality, cognitivism, intuitionism, society, practice._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jürgen Habermas on Rules - Dictionary of Arguments
III 148 Rules/Habermas: For example, rules of operation (e. g. calculation rules) have no explanatory power; following them does not mean, as in the case of following rules of action, that the actor refers to something in the world and orients himself/herself towards claims of validity that are linked to motivational reasons for action. >Addition, >Quaddition, >Rule following, >Kripkes' Wittgenstein, >Nonfactualism. - - - IV 36 Rules/Habermas: based on the model by Mead (see Internalisation/Mead) we assume that A does not produce his utterance (gesture, symbol) with the intention of following a rule and not in the expectation that the listener or listeners recognize the utterance as conforming to the rules. >Internalization/Mead. Behavioural expectations have only prognostic meaning, the conventional meaning component is missing. This means that expectations can be disappointed, but incorrect behavior cannot be recognized. According to Mead, the interaction works up to here through a mutual anticipation of reactions. (1) IV 39 Only when context-dependence has been overcome does the symbolic use of expressions or gestures of interaction occur. According to Mead, we can then say that meaning identity results from conventionally defined rules of use for symbols. >Use, >Symbols, >Understanding. 1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S. 86._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19