Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Rules, philosophy: rules are restrictions of a domain of possibilities for subjects, communities or functionaries, or generally for acting individuals or groups. Rules may be implicit or explicit, and may be implemented by ordinance or by jointly developing equally authorized participants, e.g. in a discourse. In another sense, rules can be understood as actual regularities that can be discovered by observation. These rules can be discovered not only in action, but also in the nature of objects such as linguistic structures. See also norms, values, rule following, private language, language rules, discourse, ethics, morality, cognitivism, intuitionism, society, practice._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
John R. Searle on Rules - Dictionary of Arguments
III 42 Regulative rules/Searle: these rules regulate pre-existing activities. Constitutive rules: constitutive rules create the possibility of activities, e.g. chess rules. III 39 Constitutive rules/Searle: are there any constitutive rules for cocktail parties and wars? What makes something a constitutive rule? III 54 Constitutive rules/Searle: X counts as Y in K: e.g. X (piece of wood) counts as Y (chair) in the convention (context) K, after which sitting on it has become established. The term Y must assign a new status to the object, which it does not already have because it suffices for the term X. The object must be assigned a new status by the term Y. III 55 The physical properties alone are not enough. The formula "X counts in Y as K" is needed. This formula can become a constitutive rule. - - - V 59 Def semantic structure: a language can be understood as a convention-based realization of a series of groups of underlying constitutive rules. V 64 Rules/Searle: rules represent obligations. Unequal conventions play a role in the context of translation. Convention/translation/Searle: saying "je promets" in French and "I promise" in English is a convention. Rules/Searle: the things specified by rules are not natural products. Pain can be created without rules. - - - I 217 Searle: the rules do not interpret themselves, they really need a background to work. Background: is not a rule system. >Terminology/Searle. I 269 Rules: people drive right because they follow a rule, but they do not drive for that reason alone. You also do not speak just because you want to follow the rules of language. These rules are often practically inaccessible to consciousness, although they have to be, in principle, if they really exist. - - - IV 252 Rules/Searle: example promise: Rule I: "I promise to perform the action" may only be spoken if the listener would prefer the action to be performed. Rule II: may only be pronounced if it is not clear from the outset that the action will be performed anyway. Rule III: the speaker must have the intention to. Rule IV: with the statement, the obligation to perform the act is deemed to have been accepted. VsSearle: the concept of a semantic rule ("rules of language") has so far proven to be so recalcitrant that some have concluded that there are no such rules at all. >Speech act theory/Searle. IV 253 Semantic rules/language rules/Searle: semantic rules or language rules are rules for linguistic action on closer inspection. >Semantic rules, cf. >Meaning postulates._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
||
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20