Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Stimulus: is a change in the state of a variable which, by acting on a subject or ultimately a sense cell, can have or cannot have effect or a willingness to do so. Stimuli can occur both outside and inside a living system. While in an event that is without effect, one does not speak of a cause, one speaks very well of stimuli, which remain subliminally and thus trigger no reaction. The reason for this is that several levels are involved in the processing of stimuli and inhibitions may occur during processing.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Stimuli - Dictionary of Arguments

I 66/67
Stimulus: >Gavagai: here it is about stimuli, not rabbits! - (See also problems in relation to >forgery). - Verification by society.
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I 67
Stimulus meaning: preliminary isolation of individual sentences for verification. VsCarnap: Advantage: distinction between the cases of unicorn and goblin is possible without preliminary decision on admissibility.
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I 81
Stimulus meaning: objective reality that the linguist needs. - Translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning.
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I 120f
Consistent sentences: stimulus meaning is more sparse - accordingly: stimulus synonymy less plumable. >VsAnalyticity.
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I 126
Stimulus synonymy improved by socialization (agreement) - same goes for stimulus analyticity: But now: 2 + 2 = 4 on the same level as "There are black dogs" (>acceptability).
I 379
Stimuli are not intensional.
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I 402
Existence: does not arise from the dichotomy individual thing-universal - it does not matter whether it exists. Equator, North Pole - linking with stimuli is a weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions.
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II 57
QuineVsSensory qualities - people speak and do not think about their stimuli - it is about stimulus and response.
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V 48f
Stimulus/Response/Quine: this (polar) contradiction is mitigated by the notion of perception similarity.
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V 49
Truth similarity: includes auditory similarity of words - truth similarity - analysis ignores the different origins - stimulus reaction analysis does not.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2022-06-30
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