# Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Relative clause, philosophy: the question here is about which functions and which statuses relative clauses have in comparison to other types of sentences. See also general terms, singular terms, abstract terms, subsets.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Relative Clauses - Dictionary of Arguments

II 203
Relative clauses: (x:Fx) - but not: (Ey)(y=(x:Fx)) - that would testify existence of a class - here,
mathematics goes beyond logic.
>Existence statements
.
II 199
Class Name: is a singular term, indicating a class - placeholder class name: real.
bindable variable whose values ​​are classes - a relative clause is no class name.
>Classes, >Proper names, >Proxy, >Singular terms.
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V 129
Relative clause/Quine: function: separating the object from what the sentence says of it. - A relative clause becomes a general term, if the relative pronoun is put in front (which stands for the name of the object): E.g. which I bought from the man who had found it. - The general term says the same as the original sentence.
>General terms.
GeachVs: instead understanding relative pronouns as "and he" or "if he" or "since he".
Geach’s donkey: Whoever has a donkey, beats it:
Solution/Geach: analysis of the relative pronoun who with "if he": every human being, if he has a donkey, be beats it.
>Donkey sentences.
V 133
Relative clause: can make a predication of the form a is P from every sentence on an object - E.g. Fido is such that I bought him from a man who had found him.
Relative clause: has adjectival function here - substantivic: with thing, E.g. Fido is a thing such that ...-’ original form: useful when a relative clause functions as a general term. - E.g. in the universal categorical sentence (Construction) [an a is a b], [each a is a b].
Universal categorical sentence: no predication but a coupling of two general terms.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-02-27