Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Representation - Dictionary of Arguments
Brandom I 923 Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be intrinsic. Content of beliefs and intentions must be understood before the analysis of the use is done. According to this model, the content cannot be transmitted through the use. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic, >Contents, >Intentional Contents, >Use, >Use theory. Searle/characters: sounds coming out of the mouth and characters on paper, are mere objects in the world. Their representation capacity is not intrinsic but derived from the intentionality of the mind. The intentionality of the mind in turn is not derived from any prior intentionality, it is an intrinsic property of these states themselves. >Intentionality, >Signs. Someone uses a sentence to convey an idea. In this sense, he/she does not use his/her ideas and beliefs and desires: he/she simply has them. Belief: belief is a representation. It consists of an intentional content and a psychological mode. It is wrong, that there must be a person who must use any entity as a representation, so that there is a representation at all. This applies to sentences, characters and images, (i.e. derived intentionality) but not for intentional states. (> More autors on representation). Representation needs background of non-representational skills. The compositionality principle without background is not sufficient. >Compositionality. - - - Searle I 271 Pattern: patterns play in functional terms a causal role, but do not guarantee an unconscious representation (intentionality). - - - II 28 f Representation: speech acts and intentional states have this in common: no pictures, but propositional contents. Key to understanding: are the fulfilment conditions - from representation follows no ontology. Recognition needs not to contain representation. >Speech acts, >Ontology. - - - III 185 Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. III 197f Representations are private, language is public. >Language. - - - I 195 Existence: is a truth condition. Possible existence: comprehensibility condition. >Existence/Searle. - - - Graesser I125 Representation/Searle: an object X represents a situation A, when a subject S is available, that intends that X represents A._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Representation
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19