Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
States of affairs: is an expression for something that can be represented by a sentence. See also facts, situations, actions, objects, states, atomic sentences, protocol sentences.

_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Dummett I 160
Wittgenstein/State of Affairs: even questions the "state of affairs": once we have seen that there are a variety of circumstances that can lead to the expression "he understood instantly", we will be healed by the urge to invoke to an independent conceivable "state of affairs", by which such a statement could be made true.
---
Chisholm II 166
State of Affairs/Wittgenstein: no fact - it is between facts in abstraction from their existence and complexes - an atomic proposition is true if a corresponding complex exists.
---
VI 70
Definition state of affairs/Tractatus/Schulte: combination of objects (entities, things). That things behave in a certain way, is a definition fact. - State of Affairs: corresponds to elementary proposition - fact: corresponds to the logical product of elementary propositions.
----
Hintikka I 67ff
State of Affairs/object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka:
2:03 In the state of affairs the objects hang together like the links of a chain.
2.031 In the state of affairs, the objects behave to each other in a certain manner.
Image theory/image theory/Wittgenstein/early: if the sentence is a linguistic counterpart to the state of affairs, then:
---
I 68
"Mind, that connection is no relation, but only the existence of a relation."
---
I 73 ff
Existence/ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: unlike Frege, Wittgenstein envisages in Tractatus an ontology of possible state of affairs.
According to Wittgenstein it has little sense to speak of a possible existence. That is, that we must regard the actual objects as if every one would exist necessarily.
Of course, Wittgenstein does not believe that he could say that objects exist necessarily. In this lies for him the transcendence of objects and this forms, according to him, the core of the transcendental logic (6.13).
Nevertheless, it is clear that Wittgenstein actually makes the important, but not expressible condition of necessary and necessary completed existence of objects.
Result: not only all the actual state of affairs, but also all kinds of state of affairs must be considered as if they were composed of the same objects.
Possible world/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 2022 "It is obvious that even one of the real, yet so different worlds must have something - a form - in common with the real world.
2023 "This fixed form consists of the objects."
---
III 141
Definition State of Affairs/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: combination of simple objects without quality features. The state of affairs is completely independent. Example: In the Tractatus there is neither an example for a state of affairs nor for an object.
With the account of all objects in proportion to their positions - all situations are covered. All worlds.
---
III 142
There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex.
Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: must exist in the specification of an absolute determination of the thinkable and possible.
Picture Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: an elementary proposition represents a state of affairs in that it has the same logical form. Each element in the picuture corresponds to one and only one element of the state of affairs shown in the picture. The elements of the elementary proposition, the names correspond to certain objects of the state of affairs. The name is representative for the object. (Deputy).
The configuration of the picture elements corresponds to the configuration of the objects in the state of affairs. By a mere grouping a state of affairs cannot be established. Such grouping is not true or false.
---
III 149
Sense/Showing/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: because all state of affairs are a part of all possible worlds, the sense of the world itself cannot be a state of affairs, a part of the possible world.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-02-24
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration