Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Sentences: sentences are linguistic forms for expressing existent or non-existent issues of conditions, wishes, questions or commands. Statements can be true or false, unlike other forms of sentences like questions or single words. See also subsentential, truth, statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gottlob Frege on Sentences - Dictionary of Arguments
II 48 Truth Value/Frege: a truth value cannot be part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense but an object (truth value = object). II 51 Sentence/Frege/(s): a sentence consists of sense components, not of objects. (>FregeVsRussell) Subordinate clauses that begin with "that" (>that-sentence, >opaque contexts, >propositional attitudes) have a thought as meaning, not a truth value. II 74 Sentence: the idea itself does not yet determine what is to be regarded as the subject (>Ramsey). We must never forget that different sentences can express the same idea. Neither is it impossible that the same thought appears in a decomposition as a singular one, in another one as a particular one, and in a third one as general one. II 77 Sentence: the three proper names: "the number 2", "the concept prime number", "the relation of the falling of an object under a concept" behave as brittle to each other as the first two alone: no matter how we group them together, we do not get a sentence. >Propositions, >Clauses, >Truth conditions. - - - I 7 Sentence/Frege: a sentence does not represent a proposition (only a that-sentence does that, a subset) but for a truth value. There is a sentence for each proposition that expresses it and that states the truth conditions. Vs: there is a problem with sentences without truth value (neither true nor false, not an object, etc.). - - - Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68 Sentence/Frege: except for the idea (what can be true/false) there are two other aspects: a) "content" b) "imagination". >Content, >Imagination. - - - Tugendhat II 243 Oblique Meaning/German Original: "odd"/Frege: the oblique meaning is the name of a sentence. Complex sentences: have truth functions of their subsets - where that is not the case, subsets appear as names (oblique ("odd") meaning, Quote). Nominalized Subset/Frege: a nominalized subset is only part of a thought. TugendhatVsFrege: such a subset cannot be replaced, so the truth-value potential cannot consist in its truth value. Tugendhat II 245 Sentence/Frege/Tugendhat: since all sentences are derived from the subject-predicate form, subsets must sometimes be nominalized. Exception: causal and conditional clauses._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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