Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Sentences: sentences are linguistic forms for expressing existent or non-existent issues of conditions, wishes, questions or commands. Statements can be true or false, unlike other forms of sentences like questions or single words. See also subsentential, truth, statements.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data

Peter F. Strawson on Sentences - Dictionary of Arguments

I 196
StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence stick together only by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated.
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I 214
Connection/relation/Strawson: a) stating tie: (s) "is a .." - b) stating tie: "is in relation to ..", "is an example for.." - two-digit terms themselves are not again designations of relations - stating relations between things are not themselves relation.
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I 216
1. Kind or sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier - b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs - 2. characterizing tie: E.g. Socrates is wise, is agile, argues - b) Socrates , Plato, Aristotle, are all wise, all die - 3. attributive tie: Summary of particulars due to the characterizing tie. E.g. Smiling, Praying - each of them symmetrical form: "x stands in characterizing tie to y" - asymmetrical: "x is characterized by y" - then y dependent member.
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I 219
Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: "x is asserted bonded as non-relational to y" i.e. that universals can be predicted by particulars, but not particulars of universals - but also universals can be predicated by universals.
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I 221
New: distinction between fact types instead of word types.
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IV 53
Sentence/Strawson: the general form of the sentence is: "It behaves so and so".


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-07-29
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