Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Sentences: sentences are linguistic forms for expressing existent or non-existent issues of conditions, wishes, questions or commands. Statements can be true or false, unlike other forms of sentences like questions or single words. See also subsentential, truth, statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter F. Strawson on Sentences - Dictionary of Arguments
I 196 StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence stick together only by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. >Reference/Ramsey, >Particularization/Ramsey, >"unsaturated"/Frege. I 214 Connection/relation/Strawson: a) stating tie: (s) "is a .." b) stating tie: "is in relation to ..", "is an example for.." Two-digit terms themselves are not again designations of relations. >Relations. Stating relations between things are not themselves relation. I 216 1. Kind or sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2. a) characterizing tie: E.g. Socrates is wise, is agile, argues b) Socrates , Plato, Aristotle, are all wise, all die 3. attributive tie: Summary of particulars due to the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying - each of them symmetrical form: "x stands in characterizing tie to y. Asymmetrical: "x is characterized by y" - then y is a dependent element. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: "x is asserted bonded as non-relational to y" i.e. that universals can be predicted by particulars, but not particulars of universals. - But also universals can be predicated by universals. >Universals/Strawson. I 221 New: distinction between fact types instead of word types. --- IV 53 Sentence/Strawson: the general form of the sentence is: "It behaves so and so"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19