|Scheme, content, philosophy: here we are concerned about whether statements can be made without a relativization to a conceptual system, a language or a subject domain. See also conceptual schemata, reference systems, content, substance, propositional content, semantic content, external/internal._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Schema/McDowellVsQuine: the idea of a structure that must be found in every comprehensible conceptual scheme must not have the effect that one imagines the scheme as one side of the dualism of scheme and world._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,