Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Self, philosophy: the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Roderick Chisholm on Self - Dictionary of Arguments
I 119 Self-Presentation/Chisholm: "Cartesian" Properties: e.g. being sad, think of a golden mountain - even "reddish feeling" - possession involves considering - difference: self-presentation / self-oriented: a self-presenting property will not be considered and is therefore not self-presenting. Universal properties are not self-presenting: E.g. the property to be so that there are stones. Self-presenting: e.g. pondering and thinking. Def consciousness: a thing is conscious if it has a self-presenting property. I 128 Self/Chisholm: a person uses the notion of a self, but not an idea of herself. - It is not true that when a person is pondering her attribution of being sad, that she has not only an idea of sadness but also an idea of herself. >Self-consciousness, >Consciousness, >Subject, >Person, >Indivudal, >Self-ascription._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16