Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Self-referentiality, philosophy: A) self-reference is the description of an action or statement of a thinking subject, which is about this subject. B) is the nature of a linguistic expression (word or sentence) which, by its application, should apply to this expression. See also circularity, external/internal, reference system, paradoxes, heterology, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Self- Reference - Dictionary of Arguments
II 283 Self-reference/Searle: self-reference is shown, but not seen. Twin Earth: "this man" has a different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical: perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged. >Twin earth. Self-reference/Frege: "completing sense": intentional contents are never undetermined (SearleVsQuine: no undetermined sailboat can be desired). >Fregean sense. II 275F Indexicality/completing Fregean sense/Heimson/SearleVsKaplan: I, you, this, here, etc. always have a form of self-reference: they always express an intentional content because the speaker refers to a particular entity. This is Frege's "sense of proper names". >Heimson example. II 278 Self-reference/Searle: e.g. there is a hand, and because there is a hand it is causing this visual experience. The self-reference is shown, but not seen - the one of the indexical statements is also shown but not claimed. II 284f SearleVsKaplan: Hume's and Heimson's statements are self-referential - they express different levels of intentional content. The use of indexical expression defines the conditions under which it applies. - - - III 62 Circles: there is a problem in definition, but not in use: as long as the object plays the role, we do not need to define the word. Linguistic explanations are no circles: language is intended to explain itself, it needs no language, because it is already language. >Circle._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Self- Reference
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19