Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Self-ascription, philosophy: self-attribution is the identification of properties by a subject that refers to itself through this act. The important fact is that this type of statements can claim a higher degree of certainty than external attribution b y a different person. See also certainty, attribution, ascription, truth conditions, privileged access, introspection, I, self, person.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Roderick Chisholm on Self- Ascription - Dictionary of Arguments

II 117
Self-ascription/indirect ascription/Chisholm: corresponds to Russell: knowledge by acquaintance/by description. >Acquaintance
, >Description, >Attribution.
Chisholm: then ultimately everything is attributive reference (for direct ascription) - Patently: then there is a uniqueness relation alone by self-ascription - if the existence of the object is secured.

Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

- - -
Frank I 19ff
Self-ascription/Chisholm: I can very well be wrong in interpreting my self-ascription. >Incorribility.
Frank I 261ff
Self-ascription/VsChisholm: a toddler does not judge first, that it recognizes the mother and then ascribes the judgement to himself.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and
Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18
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