|Self-ascription, philosophy: self-attribution is the identification of properties by a subject that refers to itself through this act. The important fact is that this type of statements can claim a higher degree of certainty than external attribution b y a different person. See also certainty, attribution, ascription, truth conditions, privileged access, introspection, I, self, person.<_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Roderick Chisholm on Self- Ascription - Dictionary of Arguments
Self-ascription/indirect ascription/Chisholm: corresponds to Russell: knowledge by acquaintance/by description. >Acquaintance, >Description, >Attribution.
Chisholm: then ultimately everything is attributive reference (for direct ascription) - Patently: then there is a uniqueness relation alone by self-ascription - if the existence of the object is secured.
Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986
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Frank I 19ff
Self-ascription/Chisholm: I can very well be wrong in interpreting my self-ascription. >Incorribility.
Frank I 261ff
Self-ascription/VsChisholm: a toddler does not judge first, that it recognizes the mother and then ascribes the judgement to himself.
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and
Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994