Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Semantic ascent, philosophy: semantic ascent is an expression by W.V.O. Quine (Quine, From a logical point of view, Harvard, 1953). The semantic ascent is no longer about objects, but about the use of expressions for these objects and of expressions for properties which we ascribe to these objects. In this way, the question as to which objects an ontology is fixed on is only indirectly addressed. See also mention, use, meaning, reference, semantic descent, ontology, non-existence, predication.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
VI 114/15
Semantic ascent/Science/Quine: E.g. relativity theory: overturned conceptions, but evaluation only based on the old conceptions - petitio principii. - Solution: Semantic ascent: comparison of symbol structures: then select greater simplicity - ((s) distinction between conception and meaning) - ((s) purely behaviorist).
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VII (a) 1f5f
Semantic ascent/Quine: thus the dispute about what exists is translated into one about words - but that does not mean that existence depends on words.
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X 31f
Semantic ascent/Quine: solution for generalization where letters replace names of things and at the same time whole sentences. - Wrong: p or not p for all things in such a way that sentences are names for them. - Ascent: only through sentences: correct: every sentence of the form p or not p is true. Generalization: two kinds: a) if names change: from Hans is Hans and from Fritz is Fritz, etc. Every thing is itself: no problem, no semantic ascent necessary. - b) generalization of Hans is mortal or Hans is not mortal: semantic ascent. - ((s) Also because of the logical constant).
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X 32
Truth predicate/Semantic ascent/Quine/(s): truth predicate quasi reverses semantic ascent, because it ensures that one does not have to talk about language (in semantic ascent) - Quine: it reminds in the ascent that we are targeting the world - by calling the sentence true we call the snow white. - truth predicate: reverses the quotation marks. - Sentence: simply utter it in order to assert it. - Then no quotation marks and no truth predicate. - truth predicate: necessary for generalization about an infinite number of sentences: E.g. all sentences of the form p or not p are true.
Truth predicate: reinstates reference to the object that was eliminated by the semantic ascent.
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X 35
Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in a dimension which cannot be grasped by a variable.
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X 88
Semantic ascent/generalization/Quine: without semantic ascent: if direct quantification possible in object language: E.g. (x)(x =). - (Only if identity predicate = is considered to be a logical particle and not part of the lexicon (normal predicate) - Semantic ascent: If identity is a true predicate, then only indirect generalization possible, through language, not objects.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-07-23
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