Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Semantic ascent, philosophy: semantic ascent is an expression by W.V.O. Quine (Quine, From a logical point of view, Harvard, 1953). The semantic ascent is no longer about objects, but about the use of expressions for these objects and of expressions for properties which we ascribe to these objects. In this way, the question as to which objects an ontology is fixed on is only indirectly addressed. See also mention, use, meaning, reference, semantic descent, ontology, non-existence, predication._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
W.V.O. Quine on Semantic Ascent - Dictionary of Arguments
VI 114/15 Semantic ascent/Science/Quine: E.g. relativity theory: overturned conceptions, but evaluation only based on the old conceptions - petitio principii. Solution: Semantic ascent: comparison of symbol structures: then select greater simplicity. - ((s) Distinction between conception and meaning). --- VII (a) 1f5f Semantic ascent/Quine: thus the dispute about what exists is translated into one about words - but that does not mean that existence depends on words. --- X 31f Semantic ascent/Quine: solution for generalization where letters replace names of things and at the same time whole sentences. Wrong: p or not p for all things in such a way that sentences are names for them. - Ascent: only through sentences: correct: every sentence of the form p or not p is true. Generalization: two kinds: a) if names change: from Hans is Hans and from Fritz is Fritz, etc. Every thing is itself: no problem, no semantic ascent necessary. b) generalization of Hans is mortal or Hans is not mortal: semantic ascent. ((s) Also because of the logical constant). X 32 ((s) Truth predicate/Semantic ascent/Quine/(s): the truth predicate quasi reverses semantic ascent, because it ensures that one does not have to talk about language (in semantic ascent).) Quine: it reminds in the ascent that we are targeting the world - by calling the sentence true we call the snow white. Truth predicate: reverses the quotation marks. Sentence: simply utter it in order to assert it. - Then no quotation marks and no truth predicate. Truth predicate: necessary for generalization about an infinite number of sentences: E.g. all sentences of the form p or not p are true. Truth predicate: reinstates reference to the object that was eliminated by the semantic ascent. X 35 Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in a dimension which cannot be grasped by a variable. X 88 Semantic ascent/generalization/Quine: without semantic ascent: if direct quantification possible in object language: E.g. (x)(x =). - (Only if identity predicate = is considered to be a logical particle and not part of the lexicon (normal predicate). Semantic ascent: If identity is a true predicate, then only indirect generalization is possible, through language, not objects._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
||
> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Semantic Ascent
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16