Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Sense, philosophy: sense is a property of statements which makes the determination of the truth value (true or false) possible, although not guaranteed. Even false statements make sense; otherwise their falsehood could not be established. What is meaningless, therefore, is what cannot be negated. Statements about the future allow an assessment of probabilities if they are sensible without having a truth value. Wishes and commands are sensible and understandable if they can be reformulated into negative statements. See also understanding, negation, truth values, verification, determination, indeterminacy, probability, Fregean sense._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hector-Neri Castaneda on Sense - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 325 Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: the denotation within intention in propositional contexts is not Fregean meaning, but Fregean sense. >Fregean Sense, >Fregean meaning, >Denotation, >Intention, >Propositional attitudes. Reversal of Frege: the world reference can only be explained by the objects being explained as systems of Fregean senses. Then "sense "and "reference" get entirely new meanings. >Sense, >Reference. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 - - - Frank I 400ff Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: Guise Theory: (of designs): Vs distinction sense/meaning. >Guise-Theory. From this also follows: VsFrege: indirect speech does not lose its reference - expressions always denote the same thing, namely guises (designs). VsPerry: that also makes his distinction of designating and expressing unnecessary. I 432ff Extra-Sense/Castaneda: E.g. Ivan believes that he* is required on the phone - here is (Ivan) Ivan referencce) and ego(Ivan) its special meaning i - in an assertion of speaker a "I" expresses ego(a). PerryVsCastaneda: this explanation leads to a gap in the theory of reports of beliefs - anyone who can believe anything of Ivan, can believe the corresponding proposition of Ivan that "i" is required on the phone - KretzmannVs: still private, not even God could grasp extra-sense - PerryVs: misunderstanding, "he*" cannot be replaced by description without Index - but that does not mean that the proposition "he himself is in the hospital" can be known by none other - "i"/PerryVsCastaneda: different psychological role for Ivan and Sheila still has to be explained - that Ivan but not Scheila is the reference is not enough - Ivan must also believe that he* is i, but that is initially nothing more than that i is i! - And Sheila also believes that - in addition: information that it is about their own extra-sense. Problem: the extra-sense does not help if Ivan does not know that he was appointed Editor. - Facts about the language are no solution. I 459ff Sense/Frege: psychological mediator role. - CastanedaVs, PerryVs._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19