Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
Ludwig Wittgenstein on Sense Data Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
Hintikka I 78
Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: a) given by the senses, therefore deception possible - b) at the same time they do not belong to the psychic process of perception - but they are their objects, their content.
Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: no physical objects. - Much broader: he needs them for semantic purposes: as the building blocks of all logical forms - as well as the substance of all possible situations. - Subject: is itself not an object.
Whether an object is simple or complex, is empirically not question the logic.
Sense data/Moore/Hintikka: makes a difference between spot and its color. Only the spot belongs to the sense data. WittgensteinVsRussell: they are logical constructions - they simplify laws but are not necessary for them. - Later: (note § 498): "private object before my soul." >Colour.
Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: fails to uphold a strict distinction between a sense datum as a naked individual thing and a sense datum as a complex object.
Sense data/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle and late period: the world in which we live is the world of sense data.
Sense data/Wittgenstein: the sentence is a judgement on the sense data, a reading of one's own sense-data, for example, this is red. Here, there is no need for further verification, that is a priori.
Sense data/physical event/Wittgenstein: the physical sound has a duration, the corresponding sense datum not - Listening and remembering are quite different. - Pointless: to say that one hears something and also recalls it - as e.g. one is seeing while one uses the thermometer at the same time. >Use, >Measurements.
Sense data/WittgensteinVsRealism: sense data and physical objects are not in a causal relationship with each other.
The relationship between objects and sensations is linguistically - and therefore necessary. >Objects.
Sense data/term/Wittgenstein: sense data is the source of our terms.
The world in which we live, is the one of sense data - but the one of which we speak is that one of physical objects.
Sense data/Wittgenstein: it is nonsense to speak of the relationship between object and sense datum.
Senseless: to speak of the causes of my sense data. >Causes, >Causation, >Causality, >Causal relation, >Causal explanation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Merrill B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Authors A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z