Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Utterance meaning: Utterance meaning in philosophy refers to the meaning of a sentence or phrase as it is used in a specific context, taking into account factors such as the speaker's intentions, the shared background between the speaker and listener, and the overall communicative situation. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David M. Armstrong on Utterance Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
I 116 Utterance meaning/Armstrong: The utterance of "John will not come" is a reliable sign that I just think that. I 117 Meaning: Then meanings are mere abstractions from each of the designated expressions of things. (i.e., B = Ref) But Armstrong: meaning is not the same as reference. I 117 Theory: utterances of sentences in the communication situation are exactly in the same sense characters as black clouds are a sign of rain. >Natural meaning._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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