Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Noema: The noema in philosophy is the object or content of a thought, judgment, or perception. It is what is intended or meant by an act of consciousness. The noema is not the same as the object itself, but is rather the way that the object is presented to consciousness. See also Way of givennes, Thoughts, Objects of thought, Objects of belief, Mental objects, Intensions, Representation, Thought content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Michael E. Dummett on Noema - Dictionary of Arguments
I 36 Noema/Husserl/Dummett: Husserl generalizes the concept of meaning and sense until he arrives at his conception of Noema, making it impossible to turn to language. (A generalization of Frege's concept of meaning, however, is impossible). Sense of object/sense: Tradition: In the past, it has been argued that if the sense is the condition of the reference object, then if there is no object, there can be no corresponding condition and therefore no sense. >Way of Givenness. Frege/Dummett: The difficulty is caused by the fact that Frege strictly equates the >semantic value of a singular term and the object it is supposed to refer to. I 52 The slogan "No sense without semantic value" is bribing, but it can only be accepted at the price of admitting that a singular term without reference still has a semantic value, which then presumably consists in the mere fact of the absence of a reference. Husserl has no reservations in this respect. He generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized concept Husserl uses the term "Noema". Def Noema 1: The object of the act of consciousness is given by its noema. It is in the nature of noema that it is directed towards an object and this explains the intentionality of the act of consciousness. Every consciousness act must have a noema. He perceives by means of the noema, but he does not perceive it himself nor does he grasp it in any other way. Mere means: no direct perception of independent objects. I 53 Deception: A perception caused by sensory deception no longer poses a problem, because it is also no problem if a noema has no object corresponding to it. The characteristic of intentionality is just as important. Frege rarely refers to what we are aware of when we speak, because in his opinion this does not matter in terms of objective qualities. In the same spirit, Husserl asserts that we really perceive the objects of our perceptual acts, that this is not merely a way of speaking. The noema normally does not play the role of an object of the observer's consciousness at all. And certainly not his perceptions. >Noema/Husserl; cf. >Idealism/Dummett._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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