Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Language, philosophy: language is a set of phonetic or written coded forms fixed at a time for the exchange of information or distinctions within a community whose members are able to recognize and interpret these forms as signs or symbols. In a wider sense, language is also a sign system, which can be processed by machines. See also communication, language rules, meaning, meaning change, information, signs, symbols, words, sentences, syntax, semantics, grammar, pragmatics, translation, interpretation, radical interpretation, indeterminacy._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Michael E. Dummett on Language - Dictionary of Arguments
I 11 ff Evans: Thesis: Language can be explained by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (Frege ditto). - - - Husted IV 448 DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: Language is not an idiolect, but common language prevails. (> Two Dogmas/Dummett). 1) Frege, Wittgenstein earlier: language as a means of representation or reproduction of reality, "the meaning of a sentence is its truth condition". 2) later Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Searle: everyday language and speech act theory: the constitutive rules of the language are not primarily a representation of reality, but allow actions of various kinds. "the sense of an expression is its use". - - - McDowell I 152 Language/Dummett: 1) an instrument of communication 2) carrier of meaning. None should be primary. Language/McDowellVsDummett: both are secondary. Primarily, language is a source of tradition. (McDowell per Gadamer). To acquire language means to acquire spirit. ((s) Cf. >Gadamer.) - - - Dummett III (b) 81 Language/infinite/Dummett: each quantity of knowledge is finite, but must allow an understanding of infinitely many sentences. - - - III (c) 145 Idiolect/DummettVs: Language is not a family of similar idiolects, but the speaker declares responsibility of the common usages - without fully dominating them. III (c) 150 The concept of idiolect is important to explain variations, but idiolect can be explained by language, not vice versa. - - - Horwich I 461 Language/DavidsonVsDummett: is not a "veil" - it is a network of inferential relations. - Nothing beyond "human abilities" - Like a stone against which we hit ourselves - and that is stone by stone, bit by bit. ((s) > satisfaction ,not >making true.) - This applies to "this is good" and "this is red". (1) - DavidsonVsMoore/DavidsonVsDummett. 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg), Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |