|Language game, philosophy: a language game is an expression (originally by L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 23) for dealing with language in typical situations which is responsible for the formation of word meanings in a community. See also use theory, use, meaning, meaning change, reference, conventions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Hintikka I 29
Language game/use/explanation/analysis/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: not the usual language use is unanalysable and inexplicable according to Wittgenstein - but the language games are.
Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the only thing that distinguishes Wittgenstein's late period from the middle. - Solution to the problem, random acting in accordance with the rule to differentiate from real rule sequences.
Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Brown book: not fragments of language - but in itself closed system of understanding. - Simple primitive languages. - Solution to the problem of naming: role in our language. - There are so many relationships between names and object, as there are names and objects.
Language/world/language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: StegmüllerVsWittgenstein: supposedly does not show how the language is directly linked to the reality. - Stegmüller: thesis: it would not be about the "vertical" connections, but only about the horizontal between steps in the language game. - Hintikka: quasi mere role without facts. - HintikkaVs: that would mean that not even descriptive meaning is based on truth conditions. - justification solely by the role of words in our lives. - Hintikka: Wittgenstein emphasizes the vertical relationship on the contrary - whereby the logic before each match lies with facts - such as the method of measurement before measuring. - Measurement is very probably a comparison with facts.
HintikkaVsStegmüller: otherwise speaking would be already the whole language game.
Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: distinction between language games - a) that gives a word a meaning - b) the game in which we express the word. - E.g. we learn what a lie is, not like other words.
Definition physiognomic language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. pain behavior: is conceptual - not bound to facts.
Also involves the reaction of others. - This is a logical connection, which is constitutive for the language game.
Primary language games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. physiognomic language games. - Here doubts about the certainty are meaningless. - In primary language games epistemological concepts like knowledge/belief/truth/error and so on do not occur.
Primary language games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Steps in them cannot be corrected - otherwise they could not serve as the basis of the relation language/world. - In primary language games there are no criteria. - But they can provide as a whole criteria for mental processes. - Terminology: "primary language games": in Wittgenstein "beginning of the language game".
Explore/Law/Natural Law/Wittgenstein: Supposing someone has discovered the law of energy conversion - it could be a new math - he has developed a new game. - Not new mechanics.
In accordance/Wittgenstein: dependent on language games. - tertium comparationis. - An imagination in the context of truth does not relate to us. - Wrong: to think that things would be an extension of something else. - As if a sentence would be more true if it coincides with reality - that is not an extension. - ((s) > "Make true"/Wittgenstein, >More authors on Truthmakers).
Language game instead of calculus: - the rules are not strict - undefined terms - is not a theory of the language game - VsTheories: better: to search for a way.
Metzinger II 721
Language Game/rules/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: Problem: Stability/flexibility or changeability and historicality of the language game rules. Criteria can become symptoms and symptoms can become criteria. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 354).
Wittgenstein himself tends to assume that criteria are undisputed that excldudes an appliance to exotic possibilities. (Residual Verificationism).
Birnbacher: Pretty conservative fixation: not every new application is a shift in meaning._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Merrill B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996