Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Speech Act Theory: Speech act theories are theories that place the focus of their reflections on what speakers effect with utterances rather than on the representation function of expressions and sentences. Different types of speech acts are distinguished depending on whether they are factual determinations, questions, commands, as well as aspects of these acts that go beyond a situation such as baptism or oath. See also actions, utterances, meanings, speaker meaning, representation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Speech Act Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
II 25 Sincerity condition: the sincerity condition is internal to the speech acts. --- Husted IV 251 Speech act/Searle: speech acts are rule-determined actions. They always have constitutive (not regulatory) rules. Searle: the speech act is key to the meaning. VsSearle: this is controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have a fundamentally different nature than for actions. J. Husted "Searle" in: Hügli/Lübke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993S. 251 --- V 68 The speech act is an unequal game. An explanation must presuppose rules. Rules are not equal. Convention: speaking rules are governed by behavior. For rules, behavior is not crucial. >Language game, >Convention. V 207 Traditional Speech Act Theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: the word W is needed to perform speech act A, then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something. SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones. This does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same; it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts. V 213 Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words ( "fallacy of assertiveness"). --- IV 27 Speech Act Theory/SearleVsAustin: Austin accepts verbs for acts but one has to differentiate this, e.g. the announcement of a command is not the command. IV 78 Speech Act Theory/Searle: the speech act theory differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon (e.g. linguistics: structural rules). >Structural rules. IV 86 The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence. IV 86 Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act, e.g. in literature it is no other act than in the newspaper. No semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional. IV 204 Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics. --- VII 99 Speech Act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied. --- VIII 435 Speech Act/Searle: the speech act is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker. VsChomsky: Chomsky does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg), Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Speech Act Theory
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18