Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rigidity, philosophy: Rigidity is an expression for the property of names to stand for the same object in all possible worlds, as opposed to descriptions that are not rigid and can change their reference. E.g. it is pointless to ask whether Napoleon might have been someone else but Napoleon in a possible world, but it is not meaningless to say that there is a possible world in which Napoleon is not the winner of Austerlitz. See also descriptions, names, possible worlds, range, necessity, possibility, reference, semantics of possible worlds, intensions, propositions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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S.A. Kripke on Rigidity - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 119 Rigid designators/Kripke: rigid designators are e.g. heat, molecular motion (never stands for another thing), pain, proper names. >Pain/Kripke, >Names/Kripke. --- Kripke I 52 Proper names are rigid designators: Nixon is Nixon in all worlds, but not the winner of the election in all worlds (descriptions are not rigid designators). >Possible world/Kripke, >Identity across worlds. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. - - - II 220 That/rigidity/Kaplan: "that" can make any description become rigid, e.g. "that bastard, whoever he may be." >Rigidity/Kaplan, >Index word/Kaplan._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18