Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Supervaluation, philosophy: The term goes back to a proposal by B. van Fraassen (“The Journal of Philosophy”, Vol. 63, No. 17, (Sept. 15, 1966), pp. 481-495). If not enough information is available for a decision, the consequences of different possible decisions are compared. Cases which each time produce the truth value t are called "super-true", corresponding for the truth value f as "super-false". One problem is the persistence of truth value gaps. See also truth value clusters, truth value gaps, valuation, evaluation, vagueness, sorites, indeterminacy, dialethism, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Hartry Field on Supervaluation - Dictionary of Arguments
II 231 Supervaluation/Field: Supervaluation can be used as a kind of semantics with Boolean values: the Boolean value of a formula is the set of all those (combinations of) candidates of extensions in which the sentence is true - which in turn is a special case of a lattice-value semantics (lattive-valued semantics). >Extensions, >Truth, >Semantics. II 288 Supervaluation/Field: E.g. "determined p" is true iff p is true in all permissible interpretations of the language. >Language dependence, >Interpretation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |