Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Facts, philosophy: facts are that which corresponds to a true statement or - according to some authors - is identical with a true statement. Problems result from possible multiple counting of objects, e.g. when it is spoken of a situation and additionally by the fact that this situation exists. Therefore, some authors consider the assumption of facts as something superfluous. See also truths of reason, factual truths, facts, truth, statements, knowledge, certainty, thought objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Nelson Goodman on Facts - Dictionary of Arguments
I 120/21 Facts/Goodman: facts are small theories and true theories are huge facts. I 143 Convention/fact/Goodman: when the question of the composition of dots is conventional, and not a question of facts, then points and lines are not less conventional in any case. (There is no neutral fact). >Conventions. --- IV 127 E.g.: does the moon rotate or does it not rotate? IV 128 When I say that different sides of the moon are facing the sun at different times, then this is not a statement about motion, halt, rotation. Movement disappears from the sphere of facts. We produce rotation or halt of the moon. IV 129 All facts threaten to dissolve into convention, all nature threatens to dissolve into tricks. IV 130 The statements about the moon are alternatives. But these objects, observations, measurements, principles are themselves conventional: these facts are creatures of their descriptions (> fact). Two versions are about "the same facts" in the extent to which they have some expressions in common. Each convention depends on the fact, but every fact is a convention. The distinction between convention and fact is itself conventional. IV 136 Henry James on what is real: a fact is something that does not want to give way, that we cannot not know._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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