Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Facts, philosophy: facts are that which corresponds to a true statement or - according to some authors - is identical with a true statement. Problems result from possible multiple counting of objects, e.g. when it is spoken of a situation and additionally by the fact that this situation exists. Therefore, some authors consider the assumption of facts as something superfluous. See also truths of reason, factual truths, facts, truth, statements, knowledge, certainty, thought objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Facts - Dictionary of Arguments
III 44ff Institutional facts/Searle: e.g. money, elections, universities, chess, etc. First, there must be something physical. Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true, like a condition. Fact/Austin/Strawson: a fact is what is said, not something that is testified about. III 212 Fact/Searle: a fact is a general name for the conditions how sentences relate to ... something. III 219 Strawson: facts are not complex things or groups of things. Fact and statement are not two independent entities and facts are not language independent. Facts are not what statements are "about". Frege: a fact is a true statement (StrawsonVs, AustinVs). Strawson: they are not identical, because they play different roles: facts are causal statements, not statements. III 214 Facts are "internal accusative" for true statements (spurious relation). III 219 Fact/Searle: a fact can only be formulated but not named. III 215 Searle: facts are not true statements. A fact has a causal relation - several statements are possible for a fact. >Truth makers. III 219 Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true - a condition. III 219ff Fact/Strawson: a fact is that what is said, not something that is testified about. ((s) Like Brandom). >Fact/Brandom. SearleVsStrawson: a fact is not a true statement. A fact has causal relation - several statements are possible for a fact. ((s) Like Austin). >Fact/Strawson, >Fact/Austin. - - - V 145 Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an object identified independently of facts! >Fact/Wittgenstein, >State of affairs/Wittgenstein. Otherwise one approached the traditional substance (VsWittgenstein, Tractatus). Quantification via objects is misleading. It is better to say: "there are examples"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20