Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Facts, philosophy: facts are that which corresponds to a true statement or - according to some authors - is identical with a true statement. Problems result from possible multiple counting of objects, e.g. when it is spoken of a situation and additionally by the fact that this situation exists. Therefore, some authors consider the assumption of facts as something superfluous. See also truths of reason, factual truths, facts, truth, statements, knowledge, certainty, thought objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter F. Strawson on Facts - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 189 Facts/StrawsonVsAustin: Incorrect alignment of facts and things. Horwich I 190 Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: should go beyond the "beyond" of the statement. - But there is nothing. - This comes from Austin's need for a "truth maker". >Truthmakers. Horwich I 191 The fact that the cat is sick, is not made true by the cat, but at most by the fact that is expressed by the sentence. - Reference/Strawson: a statement: is the material corollary, not its fact. - I can possibly measure the corollary with the clock, issue etc. - Fact: pseudo-material correlate of the entire statement. Fact/Strawson: not a thing, not even a composite object. cf. >Situation. Horwich I 192 It is what the statement notes, not what it is. - Facts are not "about". >"About", >Intentionality. Horwich I 193 Facts and statements are in accordance with each other, they are made for each other, if one eliminates one, then also the other. But the world will not be poorer through that.(1) 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Seel III 104f Fact/Strawson/Seel: if we call something a fact, we think it is real like the sentence says it. - A fact is nothing more than the contents of a true belief - the alleged facts are not even from this the world. III 104/105 In contrast to actual processes facts are abstract objects - they relate to a real state, without being themselves an occurrence in the world. - E.g. the fact that Napoleon won the battle, is not the same as the battle - the images do not correspond with beings in the world. --- Strawson II 20 Facts cannot burn, they do not wither - (timeless). II 250 Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: equating fact and thing leads to equating of saying-something and relate-to-something. - Statement and sentence must not be equated. >Reference/Strawson, >Statement/Strawson, >Sentence/Strawson. II 253 Fact/thing/StrawsonVsAustin/StrawsonVsSpeech Act Theory: completely different types. - Fact: what is said. Thing: about what something is said. VsAustin: believes, a statement would be something in the world. - This is a confusion with the event of utterance (speech act). >Speech act. II 254 Of course facts and statements correspond, they are made for each other - Facts, fact and situations are not seen but rather recorded or summarized. >State of affairs, >Knowledge, >Recognition. II 255 E.g. being worried by facts, is not the same as being worried by a shadow. - He is worried because... II 259 Fact: already implies a discourse context - but we do not talk about this framework, also not with terms such as statement and true. >Reference system, >Discourse. --- IV 150/51 Fact/Strawson: something to determine, nothing to be described. - There are always different descriptions possible. >Descriptions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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