Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Deception, philosophy: A deception is an idea that diverges from what would have been expected by the way in which this idea was caused, when the expectation or expectability is based on past experience or shared experiences and expectations of a community of subjects. See also error, causal theory of knowledge, reliability theory, knowledge, certainty, objectivity, intersubjectivity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Deceptions - Dictionary of Arguments
I 57 Inverted spectra/Searle: people with inverted spectra show the same behavior. Therefore there cannot be simple causal relationships. >Inverted spectra. I 259 Perspective/deception/Searle: perspective is not mental content, there are no conclusions. Seeing is no mental content (perhaps it is a mental process). >Mental content. - - - II 76 Rabbit-Duck-head/Wittgenstein: with the rabbit-duck-head there are different uses of the word "see". SearleVsWittgenstein: we do not only see objects but also aspects - we love people, but also aspects. >Rabbit-Duck-Head, >Apects. II 80 Deception: e.g. the moon on the horizon is bigger: this is part of the content. >Content._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Deceptions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19