Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Subordinate clause, philosophy: Subordinate clauses lack the property of complete statement sentences to be true or false. They can be classified according to whether they correspond to general or singular terms, by contributing to a specification of the objects to which the sentence refers to and to which they belong as subsets. See also truth values, interpretation, relative clauses, conditionals, premises._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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G. Frege on Clauses - Dictionary of Arguments
Dummett III 7 Subsentence/indirect speech/question: in the subsentence, singular terms do not stand for the object, but for its sense - this is the only case in which a (sub-)sentence stands for the proposition. Tradition: subsentences are not truth-functional. FregeVs. >Singular terms, >Objects, >Sense, >Thought, >Truth functions, >Propositions, >That-clauses. - - - Frege II 54 Description/Subordinate Clause: the discoverer of the planetary orbits = object: Kepler. (Meaning (reference): has no truth value. The meaning of the subordinate clause is not a complete thought (it cannot be the main clause). II 62 Subordinate Clause/Subsentence/Meaning/Truth Value/tr.val./Frege: e.g. Bebel beleived that the return of Alsace-Lorraine will appease the feeling of vengeance of France. Here, two ideas are implicit: 1) That Bebel believes that. 2) That it is wrong. The first meaning: is a thought. The second meaning: is a truth value. Therefore, the subordinate clause is actually to be taken twice. Since the truth value is not the whole meaning, we cannot just replace it. Similar: e.g. knowledge, recognition, "it is known". II 63 Subordinate Clauses/Subordinate Clause/Frege: e.g. false belief implies two meanings: a thought and a truth value. Propositional attitudes are similar. >Propositional attitudes. - - - IV 69 Description/Subordinate Clause/Subsentence/Name/Frege: e.g. "The negation of the idea that 3 is greater than 5". Here, this term refers to a specific individual thing. This individual thing is a thought. The definite article turns the whole expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name. >Proper names._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18