|Terminologies: here, special features of the language use of the individual authors are explained._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Linguistic view/Field: assumes no meanings as mind-independent entities, but assigns words of a speaker to words of an interpreter. - The relations are based on different characteristics. - I.e. to inferences that contain this word - that's what I call "meaning-characteristic". - E.g.
Signification/Terminology/Field: here: Relations are signed - objects are denoted. - predicates signify their extension.
Definition Basis/Field: here: E.g. the basis for predicates whose extension depends on other predicates: - E.g. "rabbit", "dinosaur": depend on the basis: predicate "identical". - The functional dependency of the other predicates from the basic predicate "identical" allows the partial extensions of the predicate to be correlated with the partial extension of the others. - Definition dependent: is a predicate, if it has a basis. - Now we can define relevance. - Definition Relevance/Structure/Language/Gavagai/Field: a structure partially agrees with the semantics of O, iff a) each independent term t of L denoted or signified partially m(t) - b) each dependent term t of L denoted or signified m(t) with b(t) relative to the correlation of m(b(t)). - ((s) in b) not partial) - Still unsolved: how do we know which terms have a basis and which that is? - Problem: the words should also have a physical sense.
Definition "weak true"/truew/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "p". - Definition "strongly true"/trues/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "There is a certain fact that p". - Det-Operator/D/Field: "It is a certain fact that". - This cannot be explained with "true".
Definition Principle C/Conservativity/Field: Let A be a nominalistic formulated claim. - N: a corpus of such nominalistic assertions. - S a mathematical theory. A* is then not a consequence of N* + S if A is not itself a consequence of N* alone. - ((s) "A* only if A", that is, if A * is not determined yet, that any nominalistic formulation is sufficient).
Nominalization/Field: ... this suggests that laws about T (i.e., T obeying a particular differential equation) can be reformulated as laws over the relation between f and y. That is, ultimately the predicates Scal-Cong, St-Bet, Simul, S-Cong and perhaps Scal-Less.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994