Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Terminologies: here, special features of the language use of the individual authors are explained.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Chisholm II 153
Noema/Husserl: the act itself constitutes the object. - Separation of files and transcendental objects.
II 154
ChisholmVsHusserl: the noema explains nothing.
Hu I 19/57
Husserl: Research Strategy: Scheme part-whole - general thesis: the existence of the world is not questioned, only our statements about it. The scheme true/false cannot be recognized by mere observation.
I 37
Real/Husserl: is not intentional, but also: the color quality experiences an "objectifying view" and the "perception complexion" is also real. Meaning/Husserl: what is meant by a sign, the speaker gives the sound a sense. We refer to an object by meaning. Meaning/Husserl: is the power of consciousness. Phenomenological pre-understanding: all objects exist only as intentional units.
I 39
Noema(thought)/Husserl: a) relational sense: as intension, b) subject core as a carrier - Noesis: is performance or the nature of the conception sense, (Greek: noesis = perception).
I 53
"Principle of all principles"/Husserl: the requirement that only one "originally given view" may be the reason of knowledge. E.g. mathematical axioms. Husserl excludes here any reference to empirical statements and creates the relation of consciousness to itself as a suitable method. "Way of givennes to oneself".
I 58
Bracketing (Era): prior knowledge is enclosed in parentheses.
I 42 f
Definition Noesis: is a performance or the nature of the conception sense. (Greek: the perception, comprehension).
I 43
Definition Noema: Greek: means the idea. There are two aspects of the intentional object: a) noematic meaning (content): it is the "how" of the determinations. Further, it is a coherent sense unit in the abundance of various provisions.
I 44
b) Noematic object (objectively) "core": is the linking point and support of various predicates. That, with what an identical "something" is being held.
I 65 ff
Horizon of possibilities. (is given by any act of consciousness.)
I 67
Interior Horizon/Husserl: is the anticipation of the dimension of meaning - outside horizon: means that perception is not limited to one object, but to the entire space of possible objects.
I 68
Appresentation: co-meaning.
I 69
Apperception: rethinks contents of sensation into attributes of objectivity. Truth/Husserl: truth is tied to the process of closer definition. Eidetic variation/Husserl: is activated by contingencies. Constitution/Husserl: it is a performance of consciousness when an object is given to us to look at. I 45
Thought/Husserl: if one understands the thinking as a process, you can see that predicates can convert.
I 72
Definition Kinesthesia/Husserl: is the conscious moving during perception i.e. >body awareness. The body is turned into the organ of perception. The sensations can no longer be regarded as single, completed, last units, depending on the way of thinking. They are in a sequence.
I 85
Transcendental Ego/Husserl: has a primordial sphere: initially there are only own things in the private sphere. We assume others to be a transcendental ego as we are. (> Empathy). Intersubjectivity/Husserl: a) objects, b) social. - Objectivity/Husserl: through a variety of perspectives. - Environment/Husserl: a) set by the intentional consciousness b) set by a communicating association of people. The communicative environment is previous to any selfish.
I 89
Def Primordialität/Husserl: this includes all experiences of experience, including the introductory experiences of consciousness that are fundamental to the foreign experience. The consequence of this would be that experiences of consciousness can be experienced by the other in their original condition. Such a conception would encompass different modes of consciousness as original: both objective and personal.
- - -
Tugendhat I 167
"Syncategorematic"/Husserl: sycategorematic expressions are not representing an object.
Tugendhat I 177
Husserl: main term "species": Translation of the Greek eidos, which means sight, appearance. (common feature in Kant, term).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992
Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-03-29
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