Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Terminology: This section explains special features of the language used by the individual authors. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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S.A. Kripke on Terminology - Dictionary of Arguments
I 125 Schmidentical/Schidentity: there is artificial identity between the subject and itself. Kripke: that is quite alright and useful. --- II 232f Russell Language/Kripke: the weak form of the Russell language: is like English. The only truth conditions by Russell are: the present king of France must exist in order for the sentence "The present king of France is bald" to be true. Medium form of Russell language: descriptions have Russell’s deep structure: there is exactly one... . Strong form of Russell language: has no descriptions, only there is exactly one... . Champagne e.g.: has the weak and medium form: here the speaker thinks (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are satisfied. Strong form: here the use could become the rule, because the definite article is prohibited. Since the phenomenon occurs in all three languages, there can be no argument that English is not a Russell language. --- Newen I 97 Russell Language/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: the Russell language contains only the attributive reading. (~ Homophone truth conditions). Contrast: D Language/Kripke: the D language includes a referential and attributive reading. KripkeVsDonnellan: e.g. "her husband is kind to her": here you need the referential and the attributive reading at the same time (not alternating). "He is nice, but he is not her husband"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Terminology
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19