. David K. Lewis on Terminology - Dictionary of Arguments

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Terminology: This section explains special features of the language used by the individual authors.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David K. Lewis on Terminology - Dictionary of Arguments

Bigelow I 180
Definition Lagadonian Language/Lagadonian/Terminology/Swift/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: by this name Lewis calls such a language, following Gulliver's travels. (1986a(1), p. 145). It is a set theoretical structure on individuals, characteristics, and relations.

1. Lewis, David 1986a. Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Schwarz I 97
Properties/Lewis/Schwarz: Definition intrinsic property: never differ between perfect duplicates. Duplicate: Defined not by sum, but by distribution of the perfectly natural property.
Def Perfectly natural property: (PNP) = fundamental property: all qualitative intrinsic differences between things (also possible worlds) are based on their instantiation. - E.g. Fred is the tallest in his family, but his duplicate is not in his family. - that depends on distribution of intrinsic properties: if we duplicate the entire family, the duplicate is sure to be the tallest there as well.
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IV 58
Relation/individuation/Lewis: Relations are usually individuated through coextension. I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: These two relations are identical because they are coextensive.
Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states.
Question: What conditions will survive the state in which you ask yourself this question?
For example, if you walk out of a duplicator, who will you be, who will come out of the right or left door, or both?
Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the former?
But of course there are also I-relations between the individual states!
IV 259
Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: wipes out the difference between intensional and extensional language - at the same time it eliminates technical vocabulary by existential quantification.
"Ramsification" neutral level: there is a system of categories, S, N, X/Y, there are three relationships of expressions to things: A-tension, B-tension, C-tension.
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I (b) 27
Theoretical Terms/TT/Lewis: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions.
I (b) 31
They can always be eliminabted by being replaced by their definientia.
I (b) 34
Here: the T terms are names of mental states, the A terms are names for stimuli and responses and also for causal relationships.
Theoretical terms: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions.
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V 11
Compatibility/Possible world/Lewis: B is compatible with A in world i if an A world is closer to i than any non-B-world. - (Reversal of rather true) - then A were>>would C is true if C follows from A together with auxiliary hypotheses B1...Bn. - E.g. natural laws are compatible or completely incompatible with every assumption - thesis: then laws of nature are generalizations of what we consider to be particularly important. - Then conformity with Laws of Nature should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds
V 86
Principal Principle/main principle/probability/opportunity/Lewis: the Principal Principle is to be modeled according to our experience with direct conclusions.
Exceptions: 1) it is about opportunity, not frequency.
2) Certainty of probabilities (opportunities) contributes to the resilience (resistance to new information).
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Schwarz I 99
Relations/Lewis: intrinsic: e.g., greater-relation (concerns only the two sides).
Extrinsic: e.g. grandmother-relation (needs a third).
Internal relation: (not equal to intrinsic relation): depends only on intrinsic properties and is reducible to them.
External relation: is also intrinsic, but just not reducible.
E.g., Spatiotemporal relation: "intrinsic with respect to pairs".
Identity/partial relation/elementarity/Lewis: These are all no relations!


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-05-24
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