Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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Terminology: This section explains special features of the language used by the individual authors.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Gilbert Ryle on Terminology - Dictionary of Arguments

Geach I 94
Namely rider/Ryle/GeachVsRyle: the namely rider does not help if a sentence does not designate: e.g [The only one who has ever stolen a book of Snead] (namely Robinson) made a lot of money by selling it. We memorize from that: Robinson made a lot of money by selling it.
Geach I 255
Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code-style": it is misleading that p does not have to be alleged. E.g. "if p then q, but p, therefore q". Conditional/Ryle: antecedent and consequent are not statements. Statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals. Ryle: here the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p", as the "code style" suggests, but rather a "final ticket", a "license for the conclusion": "p", therefore q. Solution/Geach: to take propositions, not allegations.
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Ryle I 58
E.g. semi disopsitional/semi episodicall: "careful", "unswerving", etc. do not have anything extra - they are a manner.
I 93ff
Voluntary/Ryle: the use of "voluntary" is too extended. Laughter cannot be intentional - "Voluntary" is not "responsible" for punctual schoolwork.
I 97
Wrong: to define voluntariness as the child of voluntary acts. But being fully committed in the matter with the mind.
I 174 f
Success words: healing, proving, recognizing, knowledge, observation, can, win, solve, find - these cannot be performed incorrectly.
The tendency to disease is different than habit - preference is unlike investment: (you would leave it if you would get the money like this).
I 178
Belief/Ryle: belief is a motivational word. Corresponding predicates are: "stubborn", "naive" and "temporarily".
These predicates are not extendable to the object but extendable to certain nouns: like e.g. "confidence", "instinct", "habit", "jealousy", "attachment" and "aversion".
Knowledge: is an ability word.
I 195
Mix-categorical/Ryle: e.g. act obediently, e.g. bird moves south.
I 199ff
Power words/task words: difference: travel/arrive - treat/heal - grab/hold - search/find - see/catch sight of - listen/hear - aim/meet - the performance here may be accidental.
I 245ff
Thoughtless speech/Ryle: is not frankness but that which we are most interested in. It is also not a self-explanation and does not contribute to our knowledge.
I 248
One cannot answer "How do you know?".
I 297
Mix-categorical: is usually partly general, partly hypothetical: e.g. pedantic appearance: many people look like him - not human + pedantry.
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Flor I 261
Definition mix-categorical/Ryle/Flor: statements about the mental states or acts of a person must be in the form of hypothetical sentences or a mixture of hypothetical and categorical sentences - hypothetical: if-then-categorical: reports on events and states.
Flor I 267
Defintion theme-neutral/Flor: statements are theme-neutral in which words such as "anything" or "anyone", "someone", or "something" are used.
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Sellars I 53
Defintion mixed-categorical-hypothetical/mix-categorical/Ryle: mixed-categorical are manifestations of associative connections of the word object- and of the word-word type.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Flor I
Jan Riis Flor
"Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993

Flor II
Jan Riis Flor
"Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke, Reinbek 1993

Flor III
J.R. Flor
"Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Flor IV
Jan Riis Flor
"Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977


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