|Terminologies: here, special features of the language use of the individual authors are explained._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
"Platitude"/Wright: "P" is true if and only if "P" corresponds with the facts correspondence platitude
Correspondence platitude/CP/Wright: "P" is true if and only if things are as "P" says that they are - Deflationism/Wright: accepts (like us) following platitudes: claiming something means, representing something as true, any truth enabled content has a meaningful negation, to be true means to correspond with the facts, a statement can be justified without being true, and vice versa.
Epistemic Constraint/EC: if P is true, then there is evidence for that -> enforces revision of logic, otherwise P cannot be true if there is no evidence.
Platitudes: are called so because they are intended to help preventing a weighty metaphysical realm.
Definition evidence transcendence: the presence of decidable parameter does not have to ensure that the answer to the question is equally decidable.
Error theory: Mackie (ethics), Field (mathematics). Everything would have to be traced back to a metaphysical realm to make it true. But there is no metaphysical realm.
ad I 115ff
Error theory/elsewhere: a theory that seeks to explain why our intuitions are different than the theory asserts.
Convergence 1: weak: only trend - more: Convergence 2: enforces convergence - Definition minimal capacity for truth: requires use of standards for assertibility and thus the existence of criteria - Vs "appropriate circumstances" unclear - VsWright: discourse about the strange: not minimal capable of truth. - WrightVs: there are no "permissive conditions" - Convergence platitude/representation platitude/Wright: divergent output can only be explained by divergent input - Definition cognitive coercion: a discourse enforces cognitive coercion if divergences can only be explained by divergent input - Tradition: moral discourse does not satisfy the criteria of cognitive coercion - Wright: but cognitive coercion is compatible with flexible standards, it is an additional condition for minimal truth-capable discourses.
Wright pro convergence also in the discourse about the strange.
Solidification/Wright: a solidification will change the modal status. Whether P is true, may be contingent, but if P is true, the statement is necessary that P is actually true. - Problem: this should not apply for the basic equation for shape - Another problem: "if S would be in the same circumstances, it would judge equally": if too much remains still valid in other possible worlds, the equation would be true in all possible worlds and the distinction gets questionable._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008