|Theoretical entities: Theoretical entities are accepted unobservable objects within a theory which are indirectly derived from observations in connection with the methods of the theory and the application rules of their vocabulary. See also observation language, observability, theoretical terms, unobservable, existence assumption, theories, Ramsey sentence, Carnap sentence, theories._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Theoretical entities/unobservable/mathematics/physics/Field: are theoretical entities like electrons justified by the same methodology as mathematical entities (numbers, etc.)? - Quine-Putnam argument: many physical theories require fixation on numbers, but functions, etc. not on electrons. - Stronger: Electrons cannot be accepted without mathematics - N.B.: one could not say that the best explanations involving mathematical entities are weaker than those involving electrons, because the explanations would be the same.
Theoretical terms/observation/observation sentences/ontology/physics/Field: a theory which is assuming e.g. subatomic particles can be observing-wise equivalent to one which does not assume it. - That is, the theoretical entities can be eliminated for observation sets. Then the theory has less explanatory power. - Mathematical entities: are not so easy to eliminate.
Theoretical entities/physics/unobservable/utility/Field: play a role in strong theories from which we can derive a large number of phenomena. - ((s) Phenomena, predictions, observations: are derivable from physical entities, not from mathematical entities).
A theory without e.g. subatomic particles: would not have simple principles. If a theory without theoretical entities produced the same consequences as one with theoretical entities, this theory could never be tested.
Theoretical entities/Field: Theories about nobservable things are certainly not conservative. They lead to real new conclusions about observable things. - Unlike theories with mathematical entities. - Mathematical entities are true-maintaining within nominalistic inferences._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994