Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Theories: theories are statement systems for the explanation of observations, e.g. of behavior or physical, chemical or biological processes. When setting up theories, a subject domain, a vocabulary of the terms to be used and admissible methods of observation are defined. In addition to explanations, the goal of the theory formation is the predictability and comparability of observations. See also systems, models, experiments, observation, observation language, theoretical terms, theoretical entities, predictions, analogies, comparisons, evidence, verification, reduction, definitions, definability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Theories - Dictionary of Arguments
I (b) 31 Theory/Lewis: has more theorems than follow logically from its postulate (the definition of the theoretical terms) - namely the claim that the theoretical entities are the only ones to implement the theory. I (b) 22 Theoretical identifications are not determined, they rather follow from the theories that they make possible. I (b) 21f Theory: theoretical terms: can be functionally defined, with recourse to causal roles. >Theoretical term/Lewis, >Causal role/Lewis. Theory: In our present case, the theoretical terms are to name components of the near-implementation. (The closest implementation of the theory). We should only use the escape route of treating theoretical terms like failed descriptions when the story comes close to realization. (closest possible worlds). >Similarity metrics/Lewis. I (b) 27 We know very well that scientific theories are often almost implemented and rarely implemented. I (b) 31 Theory: If I am right, theoretical terms can be eliminated. We can always replace them with their definientia. This does not mean that theories are fictions or their entities are unreal. On The Contrary! Because we understand the A terms and the theoretical terms can be defined with their help, theories have a meaning without compromising. And then their entities actually exist. >Terminology/Lewis. I (b) 32 These theoretical identifications are no stipulations. They are deductive conclusions. And in this way we will conclude one day that the mental states G1, G2,... are the neural states N1, N2,.... --- IV 93 Theory/Unambiguousness/Implementation/Lewis: a theory which claims to explain everything (e.g. a machine) cannot have a second implementation - ((s) > functionalism)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19