Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Theories: theories are statement systems for the explanation of observations, e.g. of behavior or physical, chemical or biological processes. When setting up theories, a subject domain, a vocabulary of the terms to be used and admissible methods of observation are defined. In addition to explanations, the goal of the theory formation is the predictability and comparability of observations. See also systems, models, experiments, observation, observation language, theoretical terms, theoretical entities, predictions, analogies, comparisons, evidence, verification, reduction, definitions, definability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Theories - Dictionary of Arguments
I 34 Theory does not have to be based on intention, it was internalized in the past. I 56 QuineVsVerification: it is pointless to equate a sentence within the theory with one outside - Inter-theoretically no meaning - no additions with "or" ((s) Cf. Goodman, Davidson, "fake theories"). >Verification, >Additional hypotheses. I 57 For the time being, we retain our beliefs in theory creation. I 74 Basics for a theory: Carnap: terms - Quine: sentences. I 393 Theory is only predication, universal quantification, truth function (for derived properties) - general term (for primary properties) - (no "because"). I 429 Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: behavior in every case more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore it is acceptable - but not allowed in ontology - unlike geometric object: Position of mass points made no sense - therefore no individuation - no identity. (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960(1), §52.) I 431 Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically - like Church: "true in a higher sense" - sometimes acceptable. I 432 Theory: Structure of meaning, not choice of objects (Ramsey, Russell) Quine: new: even with physical objects they are also theoretical. Reason: sentences are semantically primary. >Frege principle. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press --- II 45 Equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation - both true - but possibly logically incompatible. --- VI 134 Theory/Empirically equivalent/logically equivalent/Quine: Two theories can be logically incompatible and yet empirically equivalent. E.g. Riemann/Euclidean geometry. Case 1: even untransformable theories (in the same terminology, where each implies certain sentences that the other one does not imply) are empirically equivalent - no problem. Case 2: additional theoretical terms Case 3: logically incompatible. Davidson: can be traced back to case 2 - because contentious sentences depend on theoretical terms which are not empirical - therefore they are still empirically equivalent. Solution: theoretical term in question in two spellings (according to theory) - that makes them logically compatible. >Theoretical terms. VI 136 Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Case 2: (theory for global worlds without context embedding): solution: eliminate exotic terms (without predictive power) Important argument: then it is about consistency (otherwise QuineVsConsistency theory). Elimination: justified by the fact that we have no other access to the truth except our own theory. >Elimination. VI 139 Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Variant/Davidson: Both theories are valid, truth predicate: in comprehensive, neutral language. QuineVsDavidson: how much further should the variables reach then? - We need a stop, because we do not want a third theory - "everything different"/Important argument: the two systems definitely describe the same world - purely verbal question. --- XII 70 Theory form/Quine: after abstraction of the meanings of the non-logical vocabulary and the value range of the variables - reinterpretation of the theory form provides models. >Vocabulary, >Reinterpretation, >Abstraction, >Models._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2023-06-04