Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Token-Physicalism: within the philosophy of the mind, physicalism represents the thesis that mental processes are to be traced back to physical processes. The token-physicalism assumes that individual mental processes can be related 11 to certain individual physical processes. See also physicalism, materialism, identity theory, functionalism, eliminationism, dualism. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jerry Fodor on Token-Physicalism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 137 Token Physicalism/Fodor: 1) Token physicalism is weaker than materialism. Def materialism/Fodor: materialism asserts both: that the token physicalism is true and that every event falls under the laws of one or another science (so you can be token physicalist without being a materialist). >Materialism. 2) The token physicalism is weaker than the type physicalism. Def type physicalism/Fodor: any property that is mentioned in the laws of any science, is a physical property. Token physicalism does not include type physicalism, because the contingent identity of an event pair probably does not guarantee the identity of the properties whose instantiation constitutes the events, not even if the event identity is nomologically necessary. I 138 If, on the other hand, every event is the instantiation of a property, then the type physicalism includes the token physicalism: two properties will be identical when they exist in the instantiation of the same property through the same individual at the same time. Token physicalism is weaker than the reductionism. >Reductionism, >Reduction._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Fodor
> Counter arguments in relation to Token-Physicalism
