|Type/Token Identity, philosophy: type identity and token identity are modes of the identity theory which assumes that mental states or processes are identical to physical states or processes. According to the type-identity, however, the correspondence is not at the level of the individual events, but at the level of more generally described types of occurrences. See also identity theory, physicalism, token-physicalism, type-physicalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Pauen I 107
Type identity/Pauen: Feigl, Place, Smart: empirically determined, as between H20 and each water, clouds, ice. Not necessary because empirical. (KripkeVs). Feigl: "dual access" - token identity: > functionalism. - >Anomalous monism (>Supervenience/Davidson), - aspect dualism (actual monism) - all agree: Thesis: each mental process is identical with a neural process - therefore it must be possible in principle to investigate conditions of the first person from the perspective of the third person.
Type-identity/VsType identity/Pauen: 1. It has been previously empirically impossible to determine exactly describable types of neuronal processes - 2 even in stable psychophysical correlations would an identification not make sense - why should the uniform activity of unconscious neurons be identical with consciousness?
Token-identity/Pauen: weaker version of the identity theory: it is sufficient that every mental state has some physical realization - it is no longer required, that there is a certain type of neural states, which is identical with the type of pain - "subspecies: "Anomalous monism" - >functionalism.
Type-identity/Pauen: today attractive again - ontological thrift - they must not insist that we mean functional relationships "in reality" when we speak of mental processes - therefore the mental state also has causality. (See Type-/Tokenidentity)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001