Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Aboutness, being about philosophy: The context in which this expression occurs is the reference to a linguistic expression on something beyond its linguistic level. The being-about-something makes a decisive step that distinguishes objects from everything else. Objects cannot be about something. In this sense, also individual words are to be understood as objects. In a wider sense, actions can also be about something. See also intentionality, intentions, reference, self-reference, levels, description levels, pointing, circularity, subsententials.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Arthur N. Prior on Aboutness - Dictionary of Arguments

Prior I21
"about"/Prior: believing-that, thinking-that: never goes about propositions, but rather, what propositions are about. - "about" is systematically ambiguous; what it means depends on what kind of a name or quasi-names (eg numbers) follows.
Prior I 57f
"about" / Prior: instead of propositions about propositions (identity of propos E.g. "Bachelors ... "/" unmarried ... ") - better: "if someone expresses .."Bachelors...". he expresses the same propos. as "..unmarried ..." this is not about propositions.
Prior I 155f
"about" / Unicorn: that a sentence is really about something (existent), cannot depend on the shape, because the shape is the same when the subject is fictional.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-07-29
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